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ARTICLE 
Cassandra Burke Robertson 
Conflicts of Interest and Law-Firm Structure 
Abstract.  Business and law are increasingly practiced on a transnational 
scale, and law firms are adopting new business structures in order to compete 
on this global playing field.  Over the last decade, global law firms have merged 
into so-called “mega-brands” or “mega-firms”—that is, associations of national 
or regional law firms that join together under a single brand worldwide.  For 
law firms, the most common mega-firm structure has been the Swiss verein, 
though the English “Company Limited by Guarantee” structure is growing in 
popularity as well, as is the similar “European Economic Interest Grouping.”  
All of these structures allow related entities to affiliate under a single brand, yet 
retain a separate legal identity.  Law firms such as Baker & Mackenzie, Norton 
Rose Fulbright, and Dentons have all adopted the verein structure for their 
global practice.  Each has separate legal entities practicing at a regional or 
national level (such as Dentons US LLP, or Norton Rose Fulbright Canada 
LLP), with the entities coming together under a single brand globally. 
As the mega-brand structure becomes more common, courts have struggled 
with how to treat imputed conflicts of interest.  Is the verein (or similar entity) 
a single law firm, such that a client representation by one of the verein members 
will automatically prohibit other verein members from representing a client 
with conflicting interests?  Or does the separate legal status of each of the verein 
members mean that Norton Rose Fulbright Australia could represent a client 
adverse to Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP—potentially even in the same 
proceeding? 
This article examines mega-firm conflicts from a client-protection 
perspective.  It analyzes the policy goals underlying traditional rules on conflict 
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imputation, including the need to protect client confidences and loyalty.  It 
considers how conflicts of interest have been resolved in the mirror situation—
that is, when law-firm clients are themselves global entities composed of related 
corporate entities—and analyzes how the conflict rules developed for related 
client entities could be adapted to fit global law firm vereins.  The article 
ultimately argues that an overly broad imputation of conflicts carries real risk to 
clients and potential clients by limiting their ability to secure counsel of their 
choice.  An approach focused more tightly on protecting the underlying values 
of confidentiality and loyalty can ensure client protection while still allowing 
clients to reap the benefit of innovation in law-firm business practices. 
Author.  Cassandra Burke Robertson is the John Deaver Drinko—
BakerHostetler Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law and Director of the Center for Professional Ethics, whose mission is to 
explore moral choices across professional lines in a variety of disciplines.  Her 
scholarship focuses on legal ethics and litigation procedure within a globalizing 
practice of law. She has co-authored a professional responsibility casebook and 
published articles in multiple law reviews.  In addition, she serves as an Ohio 
commissioner for the Uniform Law Commission and chairs the Appellate 
Litigation subcommittee of the ABA’s Civil Rights Litigation Committee. 
Prior to becoming a professor, Robertson clerked for the Texas Supreme 
Court and served as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Texas 
Attorney General.  Robertson received a law degree and joint masters’ degrees 
in Middle Eastern Studies and Public Affairs from the University of Texas at 
Austin. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The world has gotten smaller.  The communications revolution of the 
early twenty-first century has made it much easier for people to buy, sell, 
and communicate across the globe.1  Business guides talk about the “death 
of distance.”2  Communication across vast distances can occur nearly 
 
1. See generally Rae Goldsmith, Communication Revolution, CASE (July–Aug. 2013), 
https://www.case.org/Publications_and_Products/2013/July/August_2013/Communication_Revol
ution_.html [https://perma.cc/X7LR-Y84J] (describing the communications revolution and noting 
many “communications professionals are grappling with increased demands—social media, mobile 
websites, digital publications—while managing traditional print media”). 
2. Frances Cairncross, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Is Changing Our 
Lives—Distance Isn’t What It Used to Be, HARV. BUS. SCH. (May 14, 2001), 
https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-death-of-distance-how-the-communications-revolution-is-chang 
ing-our-lives-distance-isn-t-what-it-used-to-be [https://perma.cc/6LPB-YEK2]. 
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instantaneously, with goods following shortly thereafter.  Schoolteachers in 
Iowa can order supplies off of Amazon to be delivered from China; aspiring 
pop stars can perform on YouTube from their apartments in South Korea 
and find fans worldwide. 
The expansion of worldwide communication and commerce created a 
need for law to follow.  The same tools that facilitate international 
commerce also facilitate the worldwide provision of legal services.  Lawyers 
in New York can easily collaborate with their peers in San Francisco, 
London, and Hong Kong, sharing discussions and co-authoring documents 
in real time.  The growth of transnational business and the ease of worldwide 
communication paved the way for law firms to combine on a huge scale.  At 
the same time, the rapid growth and new organizational structures of global 
law firms have created challenges for legal regulation—especially when it 
comes to handling the potential conflicts of interest that can arise as law 
firms grow ever-larger.  Finding a way to analyze and address such issues is 
important, however, if clients and law firms are to reap the benefits of 
innovation in business and law. 
II.    THE RISE OF THE MEGA-BRAND STRUCTURE 
In the last ten years, so-called “mega-firms” have dominated the global 
legal landscape.3  Five of the world’s largest law firms are now structured as 
vereins—a Swiss organizational structure that allows individual entities to join 
together in a larger organization without losing their underlying structure or 
independence.4  Now, the verein has been joined by other organizational 
structures that share key elements including common branding, shared 
administrative support, and a single board of directors, while still offering 
structural independence for member entities.5  The Company Limited by 
Guarantee (CLG) is a similar structure arising out of the United Kingdom, 
 
3. See generally DYKEMA, https://www.dykema.com [https://perma.cc/9BPM-E7NF] (“We 
serve clients around the world from our [thirteen] strategically situated offices in Michigan, Illinois, 
Washington, D.C., Texas, California, and Minnesota.”); HAYNESBOONE, http://www.haynesboone. 
com/experience/practices/international [https://perma.cc/6X8H-67PK] (“Because your business 
spans borders, your lawyers should, too.”); NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www.nortonrose 
fulbright.com/us [https://perma.cc/5TS9-BXQS] (“As a global law firm we provide the world’s 
preeminent corporations and financial institutions with a full business law service.”). 
4. See Chris Johnson, Large Firms Pulling Back on Use of Vereins in Mergers, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 24, 
2017), https://advance.lexis.com/usresearchhome/ [https://perma.cc/28S2-7MRR] (search full 
article title; filter result category to legal news) (explaining the complex structure of vereins and their 
use by the world’s largest firms). 
5. Id. 
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and European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs) also offer a similar 
combination of shared administrative backing and structural 
independence.6 
A. Why Global Law Firms Choose the Mega-Brand Structure 
Global accounting firms adopted the verein structure much earlier than 
law firms did.7  Adopting the verein structure made it easier for firms to 
combine with other entities in order to grow worldwide.8  Although the 
verein has a single board of directors, each member of the verein still retains 
its structural independence.9  The key factor of independence is that profits 
are not shared between verein members.10  Keeping profits with the 
individuals members offers financial flexibility.11  The U.S. member of a 
verein, for example, can pay its employees a scale that is locally competitive, 
and the Australian member can pay its employees at the prevailing 
Australian wage.12  The entities that make up the verein do share a financial 
connection; however, even though they do not share profits, they may share 
costs and administrative expenses. 13 
 
6. Id.; see also Matt Byrne, One-Track Mind, LAW. (July 30, 2012), 
https://www.thelawyer.com/issues/30-july-2012/one-track-mind/ [https://perma.cc/24GY-EFY4] 
(“An EEIG is a network arrangement vehicle that is to all intents and purposes very similar to a Swiss 
Verein . . . .”). 
7. See Mark Brandon, You Can’t Have Your Swiss Roll and Eat It, LAW. (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://www.thelawyer.com/issues/23-november-2015/you-cant-have-your-swiss-roll-and-eat-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/5WS6-J9XR] (discussing the difficulties law firms often encounter upon adoption 
of the Swiss verein structure). 
8. See Anthony Lin, The Rise of the Megafirm, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_rise_of_the_megafirm [https://perma.cc/Q267-
95D8] (highlighting how “[a]t least some of the difficulties of [global mega-firm] expansion have been 
ameliorated by . . . the Swiss ‘verein’”). 
9. See id. (“Vereins . . . include multiple partnerships that, though they adopt a common brand 
and some management functions, remain legally and financially distinct.”). 
10. See id. (detailing how merging firms often face challenges when there are significant financial 
disparities between partners at the various merging firms, and how vereins are able to avoid such 
problems). 
11. See, e.g., id. (Dentons, a multinational law firm, emphasized “[a]t Dentons, we recognize the 
fundamental question is how to incentivize lawyers to pick the right lawyer for the right job,” which is 
contrary to traditional standards of “not only have a single profit pool but lockstep compensation, in 
which partners are paid strictly according to seniority instead of business origination”). 
12. See id. (“The lower billing rates and profitability of Australian firms relative to their U.S. and 
U.K. counterparts played a role in some firms’ decisions to expand in that market via verein . . . .”). 
13. See Chris Johnson, Inside the Machine: A New Breed of Law Firm Mergers Is Sweeping the Market.  
But Are These Firms Truly Integrated, or Just Glorified Alliances?, AM. LAW. (Mar. 27, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
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After a wave of law-firm mergers in the early part of the twenty-first 
century, law firms found that having a bigger size offered significant 
advantages.  Following the accounting firms’ lead in adopting the verein 
structure lets law firms grow not just big, but massive in size and scope with 
truly global reach.14  One article referred to the vereins as “[t]he Queen 
Marys of The Am Law 100,” noting that the five largest vereins combined 
“have more than 12,000 attorneys” or “14 percent of the total lawyers in 
The Am Law 100.”15 
This rapid growth was made possible in part because the verein structure 
makes regulatory compliance easier for the law firms.16  Verein members 
are often aligned with national or regional boundaries—for example, a 
verein may have a U.S. member, a Canadian member, and an Australian 
member, all organized under the national laws of those countries.  Each 
verein member then complies with the legal ethics and tax regulations of its 
own country, minimizing the risk of facing conflicting regulatory orders.17  
Thus, for example, a verein branch in the United Kingdom could include 
non-lawyer partners who share in the branch’s profits; such an arrangement 
would be largely prohibited in the United States, where the overwhelming 
majority of states’ ethics rules preclude fee splitting with non-lawyers.18 
Other than the limitation on profit sharing, the mega-firm’s 
organizational structure typically imposes few restrictions.  Instead, the 
organizations offer a great deal of management flexibility.  As a result, the 
mega-firms have developed varying internal practices, providing “a 
 
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202589227405/ [https://perma.cc/D7W3-C7BN] 
(explaining “[v]erein firms . . . typically choose to share costs” which directly influences overall profits). 
14. See, e.g., id. (finding Dentons, an international law firm which employs a whopping 2,500 
lawyers, holds the title of world’s largest law firm). 
15. Robin Sparkman, The Haves and the Haves Less: Verein Combinations and Mergers Pay Off, AM. 
LAW. (Apr. 26, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202549688766/ 
[https://perma.cc/H2EU-MDFF]. 
16. See Lynnley Browning, Legal Swiss Cheese, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 2014, 11:45 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/legal-swiss-cheese-291745 [https://perma.cc/7YJM-SPVD] (stating in 
comparison to a law firm that has adopted the verein structure, “a non-verein international law 
firm . . .  must deal with . . . [issues] in each foreign country where it has an in-house office”). 
17. See id. (“Verein members each handle the individual tax and legal ethics regulations in their 
own country.”). 
18. Nate Raymond, ‘Verein’ Model Allows Cross-Border Unions to Limit Liability and Keep Partnerships, 
Profits Separate, N.Y. L.J. (May 28, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/almID/1202458890456/ 
[https://perma.cc/9BJE-GVPP].  At the present time, only Washington D.C. allows non-lawyers to 
serve as law firm partners.  See id. (“Because of the passage in the United Kingdom of the Legal Services 
Act of 2007, law firms are now able to allow non-lawyers as partners, something that in the United 
States is only allowed in Washington, D.C.”). 
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spectrum of arrangements ranging from a loose affiliation to one that 
involves common branding, a common name and similar standards, systems 
and procedures.”19  For most purposes, there is no significant difference 
between the verein, CLG, or EEIG; they are more similar than different, 
and their practices depend more on the individual agreement than the 
structure.20  According to one expert, for example, “Anything you can do 
with a verein you can do with an EEIG.”21  The variety of practices within 
the mega-firm arises more from management choice than from 
organizational structure. 
The combination of member independence and common culture, 
however, has led to the emergence of some norms within mega-firm legal 
practice.  Thus, for example, shared administrative development is common, 
with the ability to create teams that cross international boundaries to focus 
on certain business sectors both broadly and deeply.22  At the same time, 
however, vereins typically do not share confidential client information 
outside of each member unit. 23 
B. How Clients Benefit from a Mega-Brand Structure 
If a shared worldwide brand makes it easier for the law firm to attract 
clients, then potential clients must see some benefit to hiring a mega-firm.  
So far, surveys of in-house counsel suggest that clients do not consciously 
consider law-firm structure in choosing their outside counsel and may not 
even be aware of the organizational structure of their outside law firms.24  
But the qualities that do matter to the client, and that do influence counsel 
selection, may be easier to achieve with a mega-brand structure.25  Such 
 
19. Byrne, supra note 6. 
20. See id. (“There is no hard and fast rule, no clear answer” to a mega-firm practice, as these 
firms are “a matter of judgment by those who assess them”). 
21. Id. 
22. See generally id. (highlighting the various ways mega-firms have implemented cross-border 
collaboration in the way they conduct business). 
23. See id. (“Clearly as the firms are independent there is not one [profit and loss statement] for 
any of the groups . . . .”). 
24. See Chris Johnson, What’s All the Fuss About?; Our Survey Finds that Clients Are  
Unfazed by Firms’ Varying Structural Models, AM. LAW. (Mar. 27, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202589233616/ [https://perma.cc/W7YQ-MFWZ] 
(illustrating through survey data that the vast majority of clients are indifferent to a law firm’s internal 
structure). 
25. See Meredith Hobbs, Conflicts, Culture and Control: The View From the U.S. on the  
Eversheds Sutherland Talks, LEGALWEEK (Dec. 2, 2016, 4:27 AM), https://www.legalweek.com/ 
sites/legalweek/2016/12/02/conflicts-culture-and-control-the-view-from-the-us-on-the-eversheds-
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qualities include, for example, a consistent level of quality; a reputation that 
is comfortable and familiar to corporate executives; and a deep expertise in 
the client’s area of business.  Thus, even if clients do not seek out firms 
based on their structure, they may well seek out firms for qualities that the 
firms can better develop through multinational associations. 
Clients in general find it difficult to evaluate the quality of legal services, 
especially ex ante, before developing an attorney-client relationship.26  This 
difficulty is compounded when doing transnational work.  The client may 
not be familiar with the local laws, regulations, and norms of a foreign 
jurisdiction, making it even more difficult to judge the quality of a foreign 
firm.27  Working with an established mega-brand gives the client a higher 
level of quality assurance.  The client—often itself a multinational 
corporation—knows that its counsel is also comfortable with transnational 
work, with subject-level expertise that transcends national boundaries. 
Brand awareness may be more important to the client than many lawyers 
likely realize.28  When in-house counsel decides who to hire for client needs, 
relying on a well-known brand can help smooth the process with corporate 
executives who may have little time or patience for the details of legal 
matters.  In previous decades, it was a cliché to say that “nobody ever got 
 
sutherland-talks [https://perma.cc/6W3E-Y9JS] (“Law firm consultants and local legal recruiters have 
called [this combination] a smart move for both Sutherland and Eversheds, as Sutherland would gain 
global reach to better serve multinational clients, while Eversheds would gain access to the largest legal 
market in the world—the US.”); M.P. McQueen, Building Your Brand; Vereins Improve Their Position in the 
Latest Iteration of A Client-Awareness Survey, AM. LAW. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://advance. 
lexis.com/usresearchhome/ [https://perma.cc/A2FF-XJ8D] (search full article title; filter result 
category to legal news) (noting Norton Rose Fulbright, for example, “has organized itself around 
industry sectors, such as energy and life sciences/health care, with teams of lawyers drawn from 
different practice areas so that they understand issues arising in that sector[,]” and that this structure 
“gives their people a competitive edge when it comes to having business discussions with clients, 
understanding the legal risks and potential gains,” so that they can give “more practical business-savvy 
advice”). 
26. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Online Reputation Management in Attorney Regulation,  
29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 152 (2016) (noting prospective clients often have difficulty evaluating 
potential lawyers). 
27. See McQueen, supra note 25 (“[C]orporate clients generally prefer to use the same firms they 
employ domestically for overseas work, if the firms have that capacity.  ‘Unless clients are very familiar 
with working with a particular jurisdiction, they gain comfort from using a firm they trust at home to 
then look after their interests in a foreign jurisdiction . . . .’”). 
28. See id. (“Building global brand awareness is difficult but important in an increasingly 
fragmented market . . . .”). 
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fired for buying IBM.”29  Hiring a recognized symbol of quality can protect 
in-house managers—including in-house counsel—against later criticism, 
especially in delicate legal matters with no guarantee of a successful 
outcome. 
For some matters, the client may hire more than one member of the 
mega-firm.  Even if the verein or related entity normally maintains 
separation and confidentiality between the different members, those 
members are likely to work well together and communicate easily when the 
situation calls for it and the client has given permission.  This type of inter-
firm and intra-firm cooperation can give the client an added level of 
familiarity—internal processes, methods of communication, and ways of 
doing business, are likely to be consistent among the different members of 
the mega-firm.  As a result, the client experience may indeed feel relatively 
seamless, even in matters that span the globe from Shanghai to Singapore 
to San Antonio—and even when multiple entity members around the globe 
are working on different aspects of the client’s matter.  As a result, even 
though a client might not have explicitly considered the law firm’s 
organizational structure when hiring the firm, that client may still benefit 
from the firm’s structure if it allows the firm to provide smooth and 
consistent services across international boundaries. 
III.    MEGA-FIRM CONFLICTS 
Over the last decades, mega-firms have grown exceedingly quickly in the 
legal profession.30  As vereins have taken over lists of the world’s largest 
law firms, some observers have questioned their place on those lists, arguing 
that vereins are merely an association of smaller firms and should not be 
considered firms at all.31  Given the vereins’ rapid growth combined with a 
business structure formerly unfamiliar to the legal profession, it is 
understandable that there are questions about how to apply the conflict of 
interest rules to these new entities in the legal profession. 
This is not the first time, however, that legal practice has had to adapt to 
organizational change.  A century ago, most lawyers worked as solo 
 
29. H.O. Maycotte, Your Startup Dilemma: Nobody Ever Got Fired for Buying IBM, FORBES  
(Dec. 9, 2014, 1:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/homaycotte/2014/12/09/your-startup-
delimma-nobody-ever-got-fired-for-buying-ibm/ [https://perma.cc/YEJ2-SLRT]. 
30. See Neil W. Hamilton & Kevin R. Coan, Are we a Profession or Merely a Business?:  
The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules Through the Increased Use of Ethical Walls, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 97–98 
(1998) (discussing the development of mega-firms in the US). 
31. See id. at 98 (noting this rapid growth sees law as a professional gain and not a legal gain). 
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practitioners.32  The law firms that did exist were structured as general 
partnerships.33  Because each partner in the firm was potentially liable for 
any acts undertaken by the firm, it was important for the partners to know 
each other well.  Operating within a law firm required a great deal of trust.  
Just as the lawyers in the firm tended to know each other well, the lawyers 
likely knew the client-representatives of the businesses they represented.  
After all, both solo lawyers and law firms tended to serve a local market; the 
lawyers may have grown up and gone to school with people who went on 
to become business leaders, and lawyers and their business clients likely 
socialized together as adults.  In this era, conflicts of interest did not play a 
big role in legal practice.  Lawyers were accustomed to practicing 
independently or in very small firms, and local lawyers worked with local 
clients they knew well, smoothing the way to handle informally the conflicts 
that did arise.34  
By 1931, law firms were starting to grow larger.35  In an ethics opinion 
from that year, the ABA first recognized a policy of conflict imputation.36  
The opinion stated that because “[t]he relations of partners in a law firm are 
so close[,]” a conflict held by “any one member of the firm” would also bar 
any other member of the firm from accepting the case.37  The policy of 
imputation was later included in the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
 
32. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional 
Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1710 n.88 (2008) (“There are no systematic 
data on firm size in the early parts of the twentieth century but it is clear that the vast majority of 
lawyers worked in solo practice or at most two-person partnerships.”). 
33. See id. at 1710 (“The model of legal practice that animates professional regulation is still 
rooted in the solo and (very) small firm practice . . . .”). 
34. See id. at 1710 n.88 (“In 1900, a firm with twenty lawyers was a giant.” (quoting LAWRENCE 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 539 (3d ed. 2005))). 
35. See id. at 1702 (noting the exploding of large firms occurred after the nineteenth century). 
36. See ABA Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931) (“An attorney may 
not accept litigation against a past client if such requires that the attorney contest the same issue for 
which he previously was an advocate in the prior litigation.  Nor may a partner of such attorney accept 
such litigation even though he was not a partner at the time of the prior litigation.”); see also Kenneth 
L. Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm Disqualification in the Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 831, 832 (1995) (listing the flux of law firms becoming disqualified for their failure to abide by 
particular professional obligations, specifically obligations involving conflicts of interest). 
37. See ABA Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931) (discussing 
attorneys’ ability to advocate for a client); see also Hamilton & Coan, supra note 30, at 73 (noting the 
close proximity of relations between partners in a law firm bars other members from taking in a 
conflicting case). 
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Conduct, and, with minor variations, adopted in every state.38  Again, the 
imputation rule39 served the profession well in the middle of the twentieth 
century, when such close relations could be presumed.  Even into the 1960s, 
American law firms had an average of only forty attorneys.40 
It is important to note, however, that the conflicts rule was a regulatory 
rule meant to create an environment conducive to ethical practice—it was 
not itself an ethical imperative.41  Imputing conflicts at the firm level meant 
that the entire firm could reasonably be viewed as the client’s 
representative—and attorneys within the firm could freely share 
confidential information among themselves.42  But this was not the only 
rule that could have worked. 
England, which saw similar growth in legal complexity, adopted a 
different view.  There, representation was viewed as more personal—a client 
was represented by an individual lawyer and not necessarily by the firm.43  
Observers noted: “[I]n England, there are little cells of offices in the Inns of 
Court where barristers who are directly confronting each other in court live 
cheek by jowl in their chambers.  The barristers are all solo practitioners, 
and the same clerk may handle the work for three or four barristers.”44 
Conflicts in England are not imputed at the firm level, and neither are 
confidences freely shared within the firm; “[T]he English bar has no rule 
providing for imputation and secondary disqualification among members of 
a firm.  Members of the same chamber may represent different parties in 
the same case.”45  Thus, although the imputation rule worked relatively well 
 
38. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (codifying 
the imputation rule); see also Hamilton & Coan, supra note 30, at 73 (discussing the adoption of the 
imputation rule). 
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10. 
40. Hadfield, supra note 32, at 1710 n.88. 
41. See Penegar, supra note 36, at 832 (explaining the conflicts rule “seek[s] to enforce an 
asserted professional obligation of the adversary’s counsel, even when a[n] [ethical] violation may not 
have occurred”). 
42. See Hamilton & Coan, supra note 30, at 74 (noting“[t]he hypothesis that lawyers in a firm 
share client confidences does not require that associated lawyers share every client confidence on every 
matter[,]” but rather “[i]t is based on common sense that associated lawyers talk to one another and 
share experience about new or difficult issues”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.10 
(“While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one 
of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9 . . . .”). 
43. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84 MINN. L. REV.  
1083, 1089 (2000) (“The barristers are all solo practitioners, and the same clerk may handle the work 
for three or four barristers.”). 
44. Id. 
45. Hamilton & Coan, supra note 30, at 97. 
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in mid-twentieth-century American practice, it was by no means the only 
mechanism that could protect the underlying values of confidentiality and 
loyalty.  As others have argued, the English example shows that “there are 
clearly feasible alternatives to Rule 1.10.”46  The American imputation rule 
allows confidences to be freely shared within a firm and assumes that they 
will be; the English rule necessarily restricts such sharing of information but 
allows greater freedom in client representation.47 
A. Imputed Conflicts of Interest 
Imputation of conflicts has remained a key feature of U.S. legal practice.  
The general rule in modern United States legal practice is that “[w]hile 
lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from 
doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9,” the conflict of interest rules addressing current 
and former clients.48  The Model Rules also give guidance about what it 
means for lawyers to be “associated in a firm,” with a comment stating that 
“[w]hether two or more lawyers constitute a firm . . . can depend on the 
specific facts[,]” including “[t]he terms of any formal agreement between 
associated lawyers[,]” whether “they have mutual access to information 
concerning the clients they serve[,]” as well as, importantly, whether “they 
present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm 
or conduct themselves as a firm[.]”49  In “doubtful cases[,]” the ABA urges 
lawyers and judges “to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is 
involved.”50 
The ABA’s comment reflects what most courts currently do; that is, 
“[C]ourts tend to impute conflicts of interest to lawyers with mutual access 
 
46. Hazard, supra note 43, at 1090. 
47. Commentators have long recommended that the imputation rules adopted in the United 
States be relaxed for multinational practice.  See Janine Griffiths-Baker & Nancy J. Moore, Regulating 
Conflicts of Interest in Global Law Firms: Peace in Our Time?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2560–61 (2012) 
(“For the United States, the most important effort at harmonization would be to relax the rule requiring 
the imputation of the conflicts of one lawyer to all lawyers in the law firm . . . when the different 
representations involve lawyers in physically separate offices in separate states or separate countries, so 
long as the law firms have implemented effective screening devices.”). 
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also Daniel Haley, 
Comment, Conflicts of Interest for Former Law Firm Clerks Turned Lawyers, 7 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & 
ETHICS 376, 385–86 (2017) (“The rules of imputation vary from state-to-state depending upon how 
recently the state updated their professional conduct rules and whether the state strictly follows the 
Model Rules.”). 
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 cmt 2. 
50. Id. 
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to clients’ files and confidential information, or who hold themselves out to 
the public in a way to suggest they are a part of a single firm.”51  These 
principles can point in opposite directions when the purported conflict 
involves mega-firms and worldwide vereins.52  These global entities may 
well hold themselves out as a single firm.  But in most vereins, no 
confidential client information is shared across the constituent entities 
unless the client explicitly consents to shared representation by more than 
one verein member.53  As a result, courts have struggled to fit these new 
law-firm structures within the larger imputation framework.  In particular, 
courts must determine whether a conflict of interest should be imputed to 
the verein as a whole or whether it should be imputed only to the lawyers 
working within the verein member undertaking the representation. 
B. Courts Struggle to Analyze Verein Conflicts 
In spite of the huge growth of vereins, and in spite of the open questions 
about how conflicts of interest should be handled within such entities, there 
have actually been very few judicial opinions dealing with such conflicts.  To 
some degree, the dearth of opinions likely reflects the sophistication of 
mega-firm clients.  Corporations with the financial wherewithal to hire such 
a firm likely have in-house counsel able to anticipate and negotiate for the 
resolution of potential conflicts before they arise; certainly, it is common for 
such clients to plan ahead in this manner.54 
Even with good planning and foresight, however, unanticipated conflicts 
can arise.  In some cases, clients may give advance consent for the law firm 
to accept the representation of an adverse party.  Even clients who may have 
given advance consent to that representation are likely to feel unhappy when 
 
51. Douglas R. Richmond & Matthew K. Corbin, Professional Responsibility and Liability Aspects of 
Vereins, the Swiss Army Knife of Global Law Firm Combinations, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 917, 933 (2014) 
(footnote omitted). 
52. See id. (“In re Project Orange Associates, LLC discusses the latter scenario in the context of a 
law firm verein.” (footnote omitted)). 
53. See id. at 980 (“The firms that responded to the survey all said that they had twelve of these 
thirteen structures in place [regarding a single conflict-checking system].”). 
54. See Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl., LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (N.D. Tex. 
2013) (“[A] general, open-ended waiver is more likely to be effective when dealing with a narrow set 
of circumstances.  If the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably 
informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, that consent is more likely to be effective.  The 
consent is particularly likely to be effective when the client is independently represented by other 
counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the 
representation.” (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2010))). 
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it comes to pass, however, and may have second thoughts at that time.55  
Furthermore, a system of disclosure and consent, by itself, does not always 
protect against significant conflicts of interest.56 
In the earliest reported case dealing with a verein conflict, a bankruptcy 
court was asked to grant approval for DLA Piper USA (a verein member) 
to represent a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings when the debtor’s largest 
creditor was represented by DLA Piper International LLP (another verein 
member).57  The bankruptcy court refused to grant approval for the 
representation, in part because DLA Piper USA had been the one to 
formally request the waiver from the entity with whom it later claimed to 
have no attorney-client relationship.58  Thus, the representation was 
prohibited, but not merely as a result of the verein structure; instead, the 
direct participation of the verein affiliate disqualified it from the later 
proposed representation.59  Nevertheless, the court suggested in dicta that 
the verein structure might be enough to cause disqualification on its own, 
finding it difficult to reconcile the verein structure with traditional conflicts 
rules: 
DLA Piper holds itself out to the world as one firm, although it now tries to 
separate itself into separate firms for conflicts purposes.  Followed to its 
logical conclusion, this would lead to the anomalous result that DLA Piper, 
 
55. See Hamilton & Coan, supra note 30, at 96 (“For in-house counsel . . . there is nothing quite 
like learning that outside counsel who has been representing you is now suing you.  ‘It is one of the 
greatest personal and professional embarrassments a general counsel or in-house lawyer can suffer . . . .  
To management, it is the ultimate betrayal of loyalty.’” (quoting Peter D. Zeughauser, Conflict Over 
Conflicts, AM. LAW., July–Aug. 1997, at 80)). 
56. See Milan Markovic, The Sophisticates: Conflicted Representation and the Lehman Bankruptcy, 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 903, 915 (“[E]ven if most clients waive conflicts of interest . . . social psychology 
research suggests that attorneys’ act of disclosing their conflicts of interest—as they are required to do 
by Rule 1.7(b)(4)—may have the unfortunate effect of amplifying the conflicts’ adverse effect on the 
representation.”). 
57. See In re Project Orange Assocs., LLC, 431 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting 
DLA Piper US was requested “as general bankruptcy counsel” by Project Orange Associates, LLC); see 
also Richmond & Corbin, supra note 51, at 933 (“Project Orange Associates, LLC (‘Project Orange’) 
sought bankruptcy court approval to employ verein member firm DLA Piper LLP (‘DLA Piper USA’) 
as its general bankruptcy counsel pursuant to section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
58. See In re Project Orange Assocs., LLC, 431 B.R. at 379 (“Here, given DLA Piper’s admitted 
conflict of interest with GE and GE’s central role in this case, the Court does not believe that the use 
of conflicts counsel warrants DLA Piper’s retention in this matter.”). 
59. See id. at 371, 379 n.3 (explaining DLA Piper USA “dealt with itself and its affiliates as one 
entity in negotiating a conflict waiver” and so the court need not “consider whether different conflicts 
rules might apply in some circumstances where international law firms share a relationship through a 
Swiss verein.”). 
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on behalf of one client, could be adverse to DLA Piper International, on 
behalf of one of its clients, without violating ethical standards.60 
Another case, this time involving Norton Rose Fulbright (the U.S. 
member of which was then known as Fulbright & Jaworski)61 also gave rise 
to a conflict claim.62  The case arose out of a trademark dispute involving 
John-Wayne branded whiskey.63  Fulbright & Jaworski represented Duke 
University, who objected to the whiskey maker’s attempt to trademark 
“Duke” in reference to the beverage’s brand.64  But when Fulbright joined 
the Norton Rose Verein, verein members ended up on both sides of the 
case—the American arm representing Duke, and the Canadian arm 
representing a part-owner of the distillery.65  The plaintiff’s attorney sought 
Fulbright’s disqualification.66  Before the disqualification motion was 
decided, however, the court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds.67 
The most in-depth discussion of verein structure occurred in a case 
involving FMC Denton Group (Dentons), a global verein that describes 
itself as “the world’s largest law firm,” with more than 173 offices in seventy-
seven countries.68  The U.S. verein member, Dentons US LLP (Dentons 
US) had represented a client in a patent enforcement action involving laser-
 
60. Id. 
61. Fulbright & Jaworski subsequently changed its firm name to Norton Rose Fulbright US 
LLP, and became part of a larger legal entity organized as a Swiss verein.  NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, 
supra note 3. 
62. See Andrew Strickler, Fulbright DQ Bid Tests Waters for Verein Conflict Claims, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 
2014, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/581856/fulbright-dq-bid-tests-waters-for-verein-
conflict-claims [https://perma.cc/X6A4-LTVL] (“In a sharply worded motion filed in August, lawyers 
from Rutan & Tucker LLP representing John Wayne Enterprises focused on that 2013 verein deal [of 
Fulbright & Jaworski] and rebuked the firm for not leaving the case.”). 
63. See id. (“A novel attempt to disqualify Fulbright & Jaworski from a trademark case over John 
Wayne-branded whiskey for alleged conflicts arising from its combination with Norton Rose may be 
the first in a new wave of challenges mining the inner workings of Swiss verein megafirms like Norton 
Rose Fulbright . . . .”). 
64. Id. 
65. See id. (“The plaintiff’s attorneys argued that the merger brought Jayson Woodbridge, a part 
owner of the Monument Valley Distillers LLC, and his Norton Rose Fulbright lawyer in Calgary, 
Robert Rakochey, into a conflict with Fulbright & Jaworski lawyers representing Duke University.”). 
66. Id. 
67. See id. (“The disqualification motion accused the firm of claiming that it has ‘an extensive 
system of impenetrable seams around it which completely insulates each firm from potential conflicts 
that might exists with clients of the member firms.’”). 
68. DENTONS, https://www.dentons.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/MM5Y-4CFY]. 
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abraded denim.69  Another verein member, Dentons Canada LLP, 
represented The Gap Inc. (Gap), an adverse party.70  Gap moved to 
disqualify Dentons US from representing its client.71  Gap argued that 
because Dentons held itself out to be a single firm, all of the verein members 
owed it a duty of loyalty and were therefore barred from accepting 
conflicting representation.72  An administrative law judge for the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) agreed, and ordered 
disqualification.73  He pointed to the ABA’s broad definition of law firm, 
stating that “in the event of a direct conflict such as the one presented here, 
the ABA would rather regard a group of lawyers as a firm—even if the case 
is ‘doubtful.’”74  He therefore concluded that disqualification was 
warranted.75 
The judge’s decision was ultimately vacated by the ITC on appeal after 
Gap settled the underlying claim.76  Because the appellate opinion was not 
based on merits of the disqualification motion, it did not fully grapple with 
the administrative law judge’s interpretation of the ABA’s position.  As 
discussed in the next section, however, the mere fact that an organization 
holds itself out as a single firm is not necessarily sufficient in and of itself to 
support disqualification.  The ABA comment does not say that “doubtful 
cases” should be resolved in favor of disqualification—rather, it says that 
those doubtful cases should be resolved by examining the “underlying 
 
69. In re Certain Laser Abraded Denim Garments, Inv. No. 337-TA-930, USITC Pub. 43 
(May 7, 2015) (Preliminary); see also Scott Flaherty, Verein Structure Doesn’t Shield Firm From 
Disqualification, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://advance.lexis.com/usresearchhome/ 
[https://perma.cc/K5VH-5PDR] (search full article title; filter result category to legal news) (“After 
convincing an International Trade Commission judge to disqualify Dentons from representing its 
opponent in a patent infringement case, Gap Inc. has agreed to a settlement.”). 
70. See In re Certain Laser Abraded Denim Garments, Inv. No. 337-TA-930, USITC Pub. 43 
(May 7, 2015) (Preliminary) (detailing Gap’s challenge of the breach of the duty of loyalty by Dentons 
after Dentons began representation of a client adverse to Gap). 
71. See id. (“On March 11, 2015, Respondent The Gap, Inc. (‘Gap’) filed a motion seeking to 
disqualify Dentons US LLP (‘Dentons US’) as counsel for Complainants.”). 
72. See id. (describing counsels argument that the duty of loyalty should extend to Denton’s 
worldwide legal practice). 
73. See id. (holding Denton was “banned under the Model Rules from helping Complainants 
bring claims against Gap in th[e] Investigation”). 
74. Id. 
75. See id. (granting Gap’s motion to disqualify). 
76. See In re Certain Laser Abraded Denim Garments, Inv. No. 337-TA-930, USITC Pub. 43 
(April 12, 2016) (Preliminary) (“On November 18, 2015, the Commission terminated the last remaining 
respondents from the investigation on the basis of settlement and withdrawal of the complaint.”). 
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purpose[s] of the Rule that is involved.”77  Relying on firm structure alone 
is an insufficient substitute for analyzing the interests of the client affected 
by the potential disqualification. 
IV.    TOWARD A CLIENT-CENTERED MODEL OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS 
A truly client-centered model of conflict imputation must begin by 
analyzing how the clients’ interests are affected by law firm structure and 
practice.  Models drawn from earlier eras may still work in modern practice, 
but they may also need some adjustment to conform to modern realities.  
The rote recital of vague standards is insufficient—under the Model Rules, 
conflict analysis requires consideration of both the potential risks and 
advantages of the representation.78 
As other scholars have pointed out, “[E]mploying the unfortunately 
vague ‘appearance of impropriety’ language” is not helpful in the 
disqualification context.79  After all, the English and American models of 
conflict imputation could hardly be more different; to an adherent of one 
system, the other likely looks unreliable.  But context matters; the conflicts 
rules are only one part of a larger system designed to protect client interests.  
As a result, disqualification rules must take into consideration the larger 
context—and more importantly, must take into consideration how the 
profession’s underlying values are protected within that larger context.80 
A. Protecting Choice of Counsel 
The ABA and other regulatory authorities have long recognized that the 
conflicts rules must walk a middle path: too loose a standard puts the quality 
of legal representation at risk by threatening loyalty and confidentiality, but 
too broad a standard risks disqualifying too many potential lawyers, thus 
“interfer[ing] needlessly with the right of litigants to obtain competent 
 
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
78. The information to obtain client consent for a conflict is instructive.  Under the Model 
Rules, a client can give informed consent to a conflict of interest only after having been apprised of 
“the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could 
have adverse effects on the interests of that client.”  Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 18. 
79. Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of Lawyer Disqualification, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71, 
155–56 (2014). 
80. See id. at 155 (highlighting the power of the court to use balancing tests to reach a “just 
resolution of disqualification motions”). 
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counsel of their own choosing, particularly in specialized areas requiring 
special, technical training and experience.”81 
Imputation within “a firm” is itself a shorthand, a way of protecting 
confidentiality and loyalty without having to analyze each case on its own 
specific facts.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct apply a 
presumption that client confidences are shared across the firm, assuming 
that every attorney in the firm shares the confidences known by every other 
attorney in the firm—even when the firm has more than a thousand 
attorneys spread across offices all over the globe.82  This bright-line rule 
works reasonably well for firms that do, in fact, routinely assign attorneys 
from different groups and different offices to work for the same client.  It 
allows the firm to be flexible in its staffing, safe in the assumptions that 
client information can flow freely even within the large firm. 
Because imputation works relatively well in this context, some have 
suggested that the same rule should apply to vereins and other mega-firms.  
The existing court opinions, for example, have focused on whether the 
verein held itself out as a single firm, noting that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct treat such “holding out” as a single firm under the rules.83  But the 
“holds itself out as a firm” standard is inapplicable in this context.  The 
“holds itself out” standard was never developed to regulate conflicts of 
interest; it was instead intended to ensure that attorneys are not misleading 
potential clients—especially in cases where lawyers’ shared offices may 
encourage clients to believe that the lawyers’ financial resources are greater 
than they are, or that any potential liability owed from the lawyer to the 
client could be satisfied by looking at a larger resource pool.84  These factors 
are unlikely to concern the corporate clients who are more likely to engage 
a member of a global mega-firm, and they are simply irrelevant to the 
underlying policy issues that gave rise to the imputation rule in the first 
 
81. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975). 
82. See Richmond & Corbin, supra note 51, at 982 (discussing the repercussions of using one 
name for all firms in a network). 
83. See id. at 979 (“If a verein holds itself out to the world as one firm with lawyers in offices 
worldwide, and in reality is a fully-integrated firm, a court might recognize a collective liability theory 
and thereby jeopardize the concept of a verein and its member firms as distinct legal entities.”). 
84. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-388 (1994) (“Lawyers 
have an obligation not to mislead prospective clients as to what the lawyer is able to bring to bear on 
the client’s matter in terms of the size of the firm, the resources available to the firm or the relationship 
between the firm and other law firms with which it is associated.”). 
  
82 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 9:64 
place—that is, the “close, informal relationship” of partners and “incentives, 
financial and otherwise” to share client information among themselves.85 
Nonetheless, some scholars have advocated for a broad standard even 
for mega-firms: “Treating the various law firms within a verein as a single 
firm for conflict of interest purposes protects these crucial client interests 
[of confidentiality and loyalty].”86  But does imputation in mega-firms truly 
protect those goals?  It is true that imputation does no harm to the interests 
of confidentiality and loyalty.  But imputation still comes with real costs, 
primarily in terms of limiting clients’ ability to engage their choice of 
counsel—especially in cases where highly technical expertise may be needed, 
where there are few attorneys with the requisite experience to begin with.87  
The more attorneys that are conflicted out of a case, the fewer choices a 
prospective client will have for representation. 
It has long been recognized that erroneous disqualification takes away a 
client’s choice of counsel.  In the criminal context, such error requires 
automatic reversal even without a showing of prejudice.88  The criminal 
defendant wrongfully deprived of choice of counsel must be given a new 
trial.89  Of course, civil litigation generally comes with lower stakes.  No 
matter how much money is on the line, life and liberty are not at stake.  
Nonetheless, the judicial system has an interest in protecting civil clients’ 
choice of counsel as well.  The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, has 
held that courts should be “cautious” in deciding to disqualify a lawyer or 
law firm even in a civil case, “[B]ecause a litigant should, as much as possible, 
be able to use the counsel of his choice.”90 
 
85. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975) (“The rule is 
based upon the close, informal relationship among law partners and associates and upon the incentives, 
financial and otherwise, for partners to exchange information freely among themselves when the 
information relates to existing employment.”). 
86.  Richmond & Corbin, supra note 51, at 936. 
87. See Swisher, supra note 79, at 125 (“Current counsel might be the most knowledgeable about 
the facts and law of the client’s case, the most technically skilled lawyer in the applicable area of law 
(or worse but rare, the only competent lawyer in the area), or a long-time or otherwise trusted advisor 
to the client.”). 
88. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (“A choice-of-counsel violation 
occurs whenever the defendant’s choice is wrongfully denied.”). 
89. See id. (acknowledging “the deprivation of choice of counsel pervades the entire trial” and 
that ineffective counsel can produce the same result). 
90. Kanaga v. Gannett Co., No. 92C-12-182, 1993 WL 485926, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 
1993) (quoting Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Wilmington, 652 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 
(D. Del. 1987)); see also Matthew F. Boyer, In the Wake of Infotechnology: Stricter Scrutiny of Attorney 
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In the mega-firm context, imputing a single lawyer’s conflict to the entire 
global entity has the effect of conflicting out a very large number of 
attorneys.  And, it is not at all clear that there are truly gains in the protection 
of loyalty or confidentiality to make such a limitation worth it.  Adopting a 
client-centered rule on imputed conflicts means considering not just the 
interests of those clients directly affected by the imputed rule, but also 
considering the broader systemic interests. 
In this way, policies on conflict management in the legal profession can 
be usefully analogized to policies for antibiotic stewardship in the medical 
profession.  Health providers know that antibiotic medications—although 
lifesaving for bacterial infections—are utterly ineffective against viral 
illnesses.  In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that over 
prescription of antibiotic drugs causes bacterial resistance, allowing stronger 
and more deadly strains of bacteria to emerge, ultimately causing more 
deaths from untreatable bacterial illnesses.91  Epidemiologists have found 
that too-broad prescribing policies create health risks in nursing homes.92  
Individual patients are given antibiotics even when clinical guidelines 
suggest that such treatment is inappropriate—perhaps on the thought that 
it is better to be safe than sorry.93  After all, the individual being treated is 
unlikely to suffer harm from the unneeded antibiotic, and there is always a 
chance, albeit small, that the patient has a hidden underlying bacterial 
infection.  So, on an individual level, the antibiotic likely does no harm and 
may even, in some cases, protect against hidden illness.  But even if the 
individual suffers no harm from a single case of overtreatment, the aggregate 
effect of such unneeded treatment leads to systemic health risks causing 
much more harm overall.94  Thus, the doctor who thinks only of the 
individual patient being treated might find it worthwhile to over treat—but 
 
Disqualification Motions, 22 DEL. LAW. 16, 17 (2004) (“Delaware courts have adopted a de facto standard 
that approximates the clear and convincing evidence requirement.”). 
91. See Brigid M. Wilson et al., An Online Course Improves Nurses’ Awareness of Their Role As 
Antimicrobial Stewards in Nursing Homes, 5 AM. J. INFECT. CONTROL 466, 466 (2017) (“Antimicrobial-
resistant and healthcare-associated pathogens cause over 2.5 million infections in the United States 
each year.  Nearly 2% of these infections end in death.”). 
92. Id. 
93. See id. (noting each day, approximately 10% of nursing-home residents receive anti-microbial 
drugs). 
94. See id. (explaining 40-75% of nursing-home antibiotic prescriptions are given unnecessarily, 
leading to higher rates of antibiotic resistance). 
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that decision, multiplied over time, will predictably harm other residents 
living in the same nursing home.95 
The same tension between individual and systemic interest exists in law.  
Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are directed to put their 
own clients first.96  But courts and regulatory authorities must determine 
how to apply the rules in manner that protects systemic interests as well as 
individual ones.  It is not enough to say that disqualification for an imputed 
conflict causes only minimal harm to the affected client; unneeded 
disqualification creates significantly larger systemic effects by overly limiting 
the potential counsel available to clients. 
A court that applies an overly broad imputation rule to disqualify counsel 
harms both the individual client and the larger system of justice.  The 
underlying mechanism is the same: the court may decide to disqualify 
counsel even when the rules of professional conduct do not require it, and 
even in the absence of any documented risk to client confidentiality or 
loyalty, in a misguided attempt to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of 
interest.97  When an improperly-imputed conflict leads to an unnecessary 
disqualification, individual harm accrues to the opposing client that has now 
lost its choice of counsel.  The client whose lawyer has been disqualified 
must spend time, money, and effort to seek new counsel, and the case will 
likely face delay.98 
The systemic harm, however, is even greater than the individual harm 
accruing to the opposing client.  An improper disqualification rewards 
parties who try to lock up the marketplace for legal services, allowing them 
to pre-emptively take away the choice of counsel from parties that might 
later stand in opposition.99  A client with particularly deep pockets can 
afford to hire multiple excellent firms, giving each a small slice of its legal 
 
95. See id. (reporting antibiotic resistance leads to 2.5 million infections a year in the United 
States, of which two percent are fatal—that is, more than fifty thousand Americans will die each year 
due to antibiotic resistance). 
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“[A] lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, 
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
97. John F. Sutton, Jr., Introduction to Conflicts of Interest Symposium: Ethics, Law, and Remedies, 
16 REV. LITIG. 491, 494 (1997) (“Often, the disciplinary standard is applied mechanically, word for 
word, without regard to its appropriateness as a procedural remedy.”). 
98. See id. at 502 (stating disqualification can easily be used to run up opponent’s expenses). 
99. See Casco N. Bank v. JBI Assocs., Ltd., 667 A.2d 856, 861 (Me. 1995) (“[A] large, powerful 
corporation could hire every attorney in a community, each to perform some minute piece of work, 
and thus forever bar those attorneys from working on behalf of that corporation’s adversaries.”).  
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business—and thereby prevent later opposing parties from hiring those 
firms.  Nothing in the Rules of Professional Conduct prevents this 
strategy.100  A comment to the Model Rules does clarify that “a person who 
communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is 
not a ‘prospective client[,]’” and therefore should not disqualify a later client 
from obtaining representation.101  But that provision means only that a 
potential client cannot use an initial consultation (without engagement) to 
disqualify a lawyer.  If the client actually engages the lawyer—even for a 
small matter, and even with the disqualification of later parties in mind—
the rules still impute that conflict to the larger firm.102  This limits the 
client’s choice of counsel even in ordinary firms, though in those cases such 
harm may be a reasonable cost in relation to the benefit of allowing 
information to be freely shared among the firm’s lawyers.103 
But in verein-style mega-firms, the cost of imputation is greater and the 
potential benefit smaller.  The rise of mega-firms means that a client with 
the ability to spread small amounts of work around the five largest vereins 
could potentially disqualify more than 12,000 attorneys from being able to 
represent adverse parties.104  This would present a tremendous reduction 
in the availability of specialized counsel.  And that cost may not be offset by 
a concomitant benefit in information-sharing.  After all, most vereins 
choose not to share client information across their member entities without 
a co-counsel relationship.  If information-sharing across entities is 
unneeded, then imputation may unnecessarily restrict client choice. 
 
100. See Lawrence J. Fox, Conflicts in the Corporate Family: Professor Wolfram has It Almost Right, 2 J. 
INST. STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 367, 368 (1999) (noting there are “client corporations who go around 
the legal world conflicting out as many firms as they can by spreading small assignments here, there, 
and everywhere[,]” but that “[n]o matter how badly our clients behave . . . .  We, as lawyers, are guided 
by different rules”). 
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 cmt 2 (commenting on the scope of 
prospective clients). 
102. Sutton, supra note 97, at 503 (“A party could discuss a matter with a lawyer, ostensibly 
seeking a lawyer but actually seeking to make the lawyer unemployable by the opposition.”). 
103. Even in non-verein firms, however, some commentators have found the harm arising from 
conflict imputation greater than the purported benefits.  See Griffiths-Baker & Moore, supra note 47, 
at 2551–52 (“This is clearly a major problem for global practice in that what is known by one lawyer 
in the firm is deemed to be known by the whole firm, irrespective of whether what the lawyer knows 
is truly confidential . . . .  [I]n a law firm with offices worldwide and over 2,000 lawyers, how likely is it 
that an associate in the New York office will have any contact with a lawyer in a different practice area 
on the other side of the world?”). 
104. See Sparkman, supra note 15 (noting how five vereins employ “more than 12,000 attorneys” 
combined and that they routinely lose “lawyers in various markets over conflict issues and to more 
profitable firms”). 
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B. Lessons from Multinational Corporate Clients 
Considering law-firm structure as part of the conflicts analysis will require 
adjustment from courts, regulatory authorities, and clients.  At the current 
time, all parties are used to thinking that “a law firm is a law firm” regardless 
of structure of size.105  But adapting the conflicts rules to account for 
modern corporate structure is not just possible—it’s something that the 
legal profession has done before, when it adapted to the complex corporate 
structures adopted by law firm clients. 
Businesses, after all, used complex corporate structures long before law 
firms even began to consider it.106  That is part of what motivates the law 
firms to expand now: the firms are following their clients and providing 
global counsel to clients that have already been working around the world.  
A firm that increases its global reach is better able to serve multinational 
clients. 
The legal profession’s prior adaptation to multinational clients with 
complex corporate structures can provide a guide for today’s verein 
conflicts.  Decades ago, courts and regulatory authorities had to determine 
how to analyze conflicts of interest in cases involving complex corporate 
entities—that is, if a law firm represented one corporate entity, would it be 
precluded from accepting a new client who wanted to bring a case against a 
corporate affiliate of the client?107  Did a law firm that represented a 
subsidiary corporation necessarily owe a duty to the parent corporation?  
Early on, some courts firmly said yes.108  They applied what William 
Freivogel, a leading expert on the law of conflicts of interest, termed the 
“bright-line” rule, holding that representing a related corporate entity 
adverse to a current client “is always a conflict of interest.”109  The district 
 
105. See Richard Acello, Taking on Big Financial Cases that the Big Firms Won’t, NAT’L L.J.  
(May 23, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202494735752/ 
[https://perma.cc/W9SX-V9SH] (identifying no differences between large or small law firms). 
106. See Charles W. Wolfram, Corporate-Family Conflicts, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 295, 
300 (1999) (“[E]xamine the issues . . . of law firms in dealing with conflicts problems created by 
corporate affiliations.”). 
107. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995) (“The 
Committee has been asked whether a lawyer who represents a corporate client may undertake a 
representation that is adverse to a corporate affiliate of the client in an unrelated matter, without 
obtaining the client’s consent.”). 
108. See generally Wolfram, supra note 106, at 328 (explaining early court interpretations of the 
all-affiliates position). 
109. William Freivogel, Corporate Families, FREIVOGEL ON CONFLICTS, 
http://www.freivogelonconflicts.com/corporatefamilies.html [https://perma.cc/AA9L-Z6P7]. 
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court for the Southern District of New York, for example, stated that the 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty “applies with equal force where the client is a 
subsidiary of the entity to be sued.”110 
Just over two decades ago, however, the ABA wrestled with that question 
in an ethics opinion and provided a more nuanced answer.  The ABA 
concluded, “A lawyer who represents a corporate client is not by that fact 
alone necessarily barred from a representation that is adverse to a corporate 
affiliate of that client in an unrelated matter.”111  Instead, the ABA said the 
lawyers must look deeper and determine whether there are other 
circumstances that could impair representation, for example, other facts that 
might suggest that the corporate affiliate should also be considered a client; 
an explicit agreement with the client to avoid representation adverse to the 
client’s affiliates; or other circumstances that would “materially limit” the 
lawyer’s ability to provide competent and diligent representation.112  In the 
absence of these factors, the lawyer and firm could accept a new client 
adverse to the client’s corporate affiliate.113 
The ABA opinion was not without controversy; two committee members 
penned separate dissents, with a third member joining both dissenting 
opinions.114  Committee member Lawrence Fox alleged that the majority 
opinion put economic gain ahead of client loyalty.115  He asserted that large 
corporate clients would likely never feel the effect of the opinion, as those 
clients had enough clout that they could demand their law firms sign 
agreements promising to voluntarily avoid taking action adverse to entities 
in the client’s corporate families.116  It would be “only the unsophisticated, 
 
110. Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing 
Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 
1981); Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
111. ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995). 
112. Id.; see also Stratagem Dev. Corp., 756 F. Supp. at 792 (“When . . . the case involves former 
clients of the firm, the Court will inquire into whether there is a ‘substantial relationship’ between the 
two matters.” (citing Fund of Funds Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977))). 
113. See Stratagem Dev. Corp., 756 F. Supp. at 792 (examining the disqualification factors between 
former clients of a law firm). 
114. See generally ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995) 
(Fox, dissenting) (detailing the dissenting opinions of the Committee). 
115. See id. (Fox dissenting) (“The last thing our profession needs is another black eye caused 
by jettisoned client loyalty in the name of economic expediency.”). 
116. See id. (Fox, dissenting) (“One of the biggest problems with the majority approach is that 
those clients that are the most sophisticated and the least in need of protection, the very independent 
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those corporate families which do not have legions of in-house lawyers, who 
will be caught in the trap this opinion creates[,]” Fox wrote.117  “It is they 
who will naively hire a lawyer, assume total loyalty and find out much to 
their surprise that the lawyer feels completely free to sue another member 
of the corporate family simply because the economic impact on the ‘client’ 
was indirect.”118 
In the wake of the ABA opinion, commentators offered helpful 
suggestions for performing a more rigorous analysis of corporate family 
conflicts.  John Steele, a highly regarded professional responsibility expert, 
suggested that “the general rule for corporate affiliate conflicts should be 
whether the proposed representation violates ‘reasonable expectations’ of 
confidentiality or loyalty.”119  Professor Charles Wolfram likewise proposed 
a “functional analysis” examining “the corporate client’s reasonable 
expectation in the confidentiality of its information” as well as the 
“operational proximity between the lawyer’s work”—for example, when 
both the client and its affiliate share the same in-house counsel.120 
Ultimately, the balancing test prevailed.  In 2002, the ABA added 
comment 34 to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7.121  The comment 
states that “[a] lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization 
does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any 
constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary.”122  As 
a result, unless an exception applies, “[T]he lawyer for an organization is not 
barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated 
matter[.]”123  Exceptions that would prohibit such conflicting 
representation mirror the exceptions originally set out in the earlier ethics 
opinion: (1) if “the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be 
considered a client of the lawyer,” (2) if “there is an understanding between 
the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid 
 
Fortune 500 companies that the majority thinks are indifferent to lawsuits against corporate family 
affiliates . . . .”). 
117. Id. (Fox, dissenting). 
118. Id. (Fox, dissenting). 
119. See John Steele, Corporate Affiliate Conflicts: A Reasonable Expectations Test, 29 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 283, 283–84 (2002) (directing attention to a change in the rule). 
120. See Wolfram, supra note 106, at 302 (proposing a functional analysis to attorney-
corporation conflict of interest issues). 
121. See Freivogel, supra note 109 (explaining the adoption of the balancing test in comment 34 
to ABA Model Rule 1.7). 
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
123. Id. 
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representation adverse to the client’s affiliates,” or (3) if “the lawyer’s 
obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to 
limit materially the lawyer’s representation of the other client.”124  As a 
result, there is no bright-line rule against a firm accepting a representation 
adverse to the interests of a client’s affiliate; instead, the firm must examine 
the larger context of the representation and determine whether there are 
individual circumstances precluding it.125  If not, then the representation 
will not be barred. 
C. Prioritizing Confidentiality and Loyalty 
A similar balancing test centered on the profession’s underlying values 
should be applied to verein-style mega-firm conflicts.  When examining 
conflict imputation within a firm, the underlying values of confidentiality 
and loyalty are what matters—those values are why the legal profession 
developed rules to manage conflicts of interest in the first place.  When law 
firms adopt new forms of organizational structure, there is no substitute for 
directly analyzing how those values will be affected by different regulatory 
choices.  A regulatory choice that imputes a minor conflict to the entire 
worldwide structure of mega-firm carries serious consequences for 
prospective clients, who may find it more difficult either to obtain 
appropriate counsel in the first instance, or to change counsel later when it 
might benefit the client to do so. 
The values of confidentiality and loyalty should retain their primacy.126  
If failing to impute a conflict threatens these values, then imputation is 
necessary—just as, when a patient suffers from a bacterial infection, 
antibiotics are both necessary and life-saving.  But as discussed above, 
applying imputation rules mechanically can lead to overly broad 
disqualification decisions that reduce the counsel choices available to 
potential clients.  Worse yet, such overly broad disqualification may not 
actually do anything more to protect either confidentiality or loyalty in a case 
where the mega-firm’s structure already amply protects those interests. 
As a result, courts and regulatory authorities should avoid a mechanical 
application of the imputation rule.  Instead, they should apply the strategies 
developed for analyzing conflicts arising from clients’ complex corporate 
 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at cmt. 1 (detailing when “[c]oncurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client”). 
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families: that is, they should look at the underlying structure and policies of 
the mega-firm itself, weighing actual practices and client disclosure to 
determine whether in fact a conflict should be imputed to the mega-firm 
itself.  Some vereins and similar mega-firms may in fact regularly share client 
information among members.  In such a case, imputation may be 
warranted.127  Similarly, there are some representations significant enough 
to the mega-firm to put loyalty at risk even within other constituents of the 
verein.  So, for example, if a single client accounts for a large enough 
percentage of a verein member’s revenue—and if losing that client could 
give rise to financial costs large enough that the costs would be felt by all 
other verein members—then the duty of loyalty and the risk of a “material 
limitation” in judgment likely require other verein members to forgo 
accepting adverse representation.128 
These are questions, however, that require analysis of the particular facts 
and circumstances at hand.  It is not enough to say that that verein “holds 
itself out as a firm”—the rule imputing conflicts firm wide was intended as 
a shorthand to predict when confidentiality and loyalty might be at risk.  
Blindly applying that shorthand to new law firm-structures without doing 
more to analyze the actual risks and benefits of such a policy risks 
unnecessarily limiting client autonomy.  Instead, the interests of 
confidentiality and loyalty must be directly considered in light of the firm’s 
organizational structure and practice. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
Business and law are increasingly practiced on a transnational scale.129  
Although corporations have grown steadily more complex throughout the 
last half-century, the legal profession is only now beginning to experiment 
with new global practice structures.  In the last decade, the so-called “mega-
firms”—vereins, CLGs, and EEIGs—have taken over listings of the 
 
127. See id. at cmt. 31 (“As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will 
almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client 
information relevant to the common representation.”). 
128. See id. at cmt. 8 (“Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if 
there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate 
course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities 
or interests.”). 
129. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 1047 (2009) 
(“Ultimately, the growth of multistate and multinational practice should tend to make professional 
standards more uniform.”). 
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world’s largest law firms.130  As the mega-brand structure becomes more 
common, courts have struggled with how to treat imputed conflicts of 
interest.  Is the verein (or similar entity) a single law firm, such that a client 
representation by one of the verein members will automatically prohibit 
other verein members from representing a client with conflicting interests?  
While these particular questions are new, the legal profession has already 
adapted to change over time—including, most notably, dealing with its 
clients’ increasingly complex corporate structures.  As long as the courts and 
regulatory authorities focus on the substance over form, prioritizing the 
protection of the legal profession’s underlying values—client service, 
loyalty, and protection of confidentiality—the profession will adapt to these 
new structures as well, allowing both clients and lawyers to reap the rewards 
of creativity and innovation. 
 
130. See Lin, supra note 8 (“The bigger a firm is, the more likely it will confront conflicts . . . .  
More lawyers means more clients and more clients means greater potential for conflicts between 
clients.”). 
